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From the mid-nineteen fifties to the early nineteen eighties, a number of eminent 
philosophers became embroiled in a rather odd philosophical dispute concerning the 
similarity of spatial and temporal concepts. The instigator of this impromptu 
philosophical dispute, Richard Taylor, attempted to demonstrate that space and time are, 
contrary to popular opinion, identical in almost every respect. One of the most 
controversial components of Taylor’s analysis was his rejection of the common-sense 
belief that a body cannot occupy two places at the same time, whereas it can easily 
occupy the same place at two times. Taylor developed a number of intriguing thought-
experiments to demonstrate this point (i.e., the simultaneous occupation of two separate 
places by a single body), thus bringing the spatial parts of a physical body into an 
analogous relationship with its temporal portions: “A ball, for instance, occupies two 
places at once, if the places be chosen as those [of the ball’s] opposite sides; . . . . It is 
tempting to say that only part of the ball is in either place; but then, it is a different 
temporal part of an object which, at the same place, is in either of two times.”i   
Overall, while several philosophers joined Taylor in his defense of the similarity 
of space and time, most notably, G. Schlesinger, many others strived to undermine 
Taylor’s project by procuring a counter-example that would reveal a fundamental 
disanalogy in the assignment of spatial and temporal properties to physical bodies; e.g., J. 
Jarvis Thomson, J. W. Meiland, and J. M. Shorter.ii The debate eventually ran its course, 
however, finally fading out of the main philosophical journals by the early eighties. By 
this time, the focus of attention had turned to a variety of different topics involving both 
temporal and spatial parts, especially regarding the classification of material bodies as 
events, objects, and the proper role of temporal parts.iii An issue that was largely 
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overlooked throughout the course of these discussions, ironically, was the status of 
Taylor’s original claim concerning the simultaneous occupation of separated places by a 
single body. Although it helped to bring the entire issue to the attention of the 
philosophical community, there was no completely satisfactory investigation of this key 
component in the case for the similarity of space and time. As will be demonstrated, a 
number of very compelling arguments that have been put forward against the 
spatiotemporal similarities espoused by Taylor and company. Yet, these investigations 
ultimately fail to address the basic conceptual issues involved in the analogies, and thus 
fail to clearly and unambiguously point out a fundamental difference in the concepts of 
space and time. In this article, consequently, we will return to the central arguments put 
forward for the similarity of space and time. By focusing on the most basic and central 
analogies employed by these “spatiotemporal analogists” (for lack of a better term), it 
will be demonstrated that there exists a very real difference between spatial and temporal 
concepts.  
The outline of this investigation is as follows: after presenting the hypotheses of 
the principle spatiotemporal analogist, Richard Taylor, section I will conclude with an 
examination of a largely ineffective criticism raised against such spatiotemporal 
analogies by J. M. Shorter. In contrast, section II will develop a critique of the 
spatiotemporal analogies that, through an exhaustive analysis of their fundamental 
structure, endeavors to avoid the pitfalls of all previous critical attempts.       
 
I. 
Taylor begins his analysis of spatial and temporal analogies by carefully 
explaining the dual role of such terms as “place”, “distance”, and “part”. Occupying a 
place, for instance, need not necessarily refer to a body’s spatial location, for it can also 
signify a given temporal location. A person can occupy a spatial place by standing at a 
bus stop, but she occupies a temporal place, in an equivalent manner, by standing at the 
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bus stop at a certain time. Another term that equally applies to both space and time is 
“interval”, or “distance”. As Taylor explains, “New York and Boston are spatially distant 
from each other, Plato and Kant are temporally so, because one can speak intelligibly of a 
long interval of time between these two” (1983, 64). Likewise, an object can possess 
temporal parts as well as spatial parts: a brick wall, to use Taylor’s example (64), has 
spatial parts that closely resemble one another, but its temporal parts bear an analogous 
similarity (i.e., the wall is nearly identical at different times).  
Having established his basic terminology, Taylor next turns to the issue that, in 
hind-sight, constitutes his principle contention for the similarity of spatial and temporal 
concepts; namely, the commonly-held belief that (1) an object can occupy the same 
spatial place at two different times, but (2) that it cannot occupy two different spatial 
places at the same time. For example, an object, such as a pen, can easily occupy the 
same spatial place (place 1) at two different times (time 1 and time 2): by just lying on a 
desk over a certain temporal interval, the pen occupies several temporal places (times) at 
the same spatial place. Unfortunately, it is not easy to conceive how an object can occupy 
two different spatial places (place 1 and place 2) at a single time (time 1). Taylor, 
nevertheless, believes such instances can be provided. In a long passage that nicely 
summarizes his views, Taylor lays out his case for the similarity of spatial and temporal 
parts:  
What must first be noted, however, is that an object is ordinarily said to be in one 
place at two times only if it also occupies all the time in between, whether at the 
same place or another, and it must accordingly have some temporal length. 
Otherwise, we find that we are talking about two objects and not one. But with a 
similar proviso, an object surely can be in two places at one time—by occupying 
the space between them as well. Someone who is standing with one foot in the 
doorway and the other outside is occupying two places at once, for instance. Of 
course it is tempting here to object that only a part of the person is in either place; 
he is not both entirely inside and entirely outside. But when this has been said, it 
must be remembered that it is a different temporal part of the object that, at a 
given place, occupies each of two or more times. Thus a person might just stay 
where he is for a while, and be in the same place at two different times—but it is 
not the same temporal part of the person that is at those times. (1983, 65)    
 
 4 
Much of the remainder of Taylor’s analysis of spatiotemporal parts is devoted to 
defending his theory (as developed in the paragraph quoted above) from a host of 
possible objections and counter-examples. For instance, one might reply that an object 
that satisfies case (1) above can easily move around in space, whereas an object that 
satisfies case (2) cannot move around time in an analogous manner. Returning to our 
previous example, the pen situated on the desk occupies the same place, place 1, at two 
different times, times 1 and 2, but it can be moved to different spatial locations within 
that temporal period spanned by times 1 and 2. It does not seem possible, however, for an 
object that occupies two places, place 1 and 2, at a single time, time 1, to move around in 
time within the spatial distance that spans places 1 and 2. If space and time are as similar 
as Taylor suggests, then there should exist instances of this latter scenario, which we have 
dubbed case (2). Yet, how can the middle portion of a human body, to use Taylor’s own 
example, move to different times while one foot occupies place 1 and the other foot 
occupies place 2? To meet this challenge, Taylor procures a variety of unusual “objects”, 
such as earthquakes and soundwaves, that ostensibly satisfy case (2): “Suppose that at 
time 1 [the earthquake] occurs (simultaneously) in two nearby towns, which we may refer 
to as place 1 and place 2, and that it occurs everyplace between these two towns, but at 
one of those intermediate places at a time other than time 1.” (1983, 69)  
Needless to say, much of the controversy surrounding Taylor’s (or Schlesinger’s) 
analogies would appear to center upon the ontological status, and thus admissibility, of 
these peculiar objects. One may contend, for instance, that an earthquake fails to qualify 
as a genuine material object; or, alternatively, that the division of a single object into 
distinct spatial places runs afoul of our normal, common-sense conception of spatial 
place: e.g., the assignment of separate places for each foot of a human body violates 
common notions of bodily place. A body occupies one place, it will be argued (rather 
plausibly), not two. These forms of criticism merit attention, of course, but they fail to 
address the central claim of the spatiotemporal analogists. For both Taylor and 
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Schlesinger, the success of their projects rests on the analogous interpretations of cases 
(1) and (2): if these apparently divergent scenarios can be brought into a close 
philosophical correspondence or equivalence (by merely substituting the terms “space” 
and “time” in the respective definitions), then many of the quibbles over the assignment 
of spatial places, or the status of strange “objects” (such as earthquakes), are rendered 
ineffective. Moreover, there appears to be no logical or conceptual inconsistency in 
positing multiple places to a single object, nor is it inconceivable to designate 
earthquakes or soundwaves as “objects”.iv As long as the debate stays in these waters, and 
far from the actual equivalence of cases (1) and (2), it would seem that Taylor and 
Schlesinger have the philosophical upper hand. 
To demonstrate the inadequacy of the prevailing methods of critiquing the 
spatiotemporal analogist’s thesis, it would be beneficial to briefly examine an argument 
advanced by one of Schlesinger’s most insightful critics, J. M. Shorter. In the portion of 
Shorter’s article devoted to cases (1) and (2), he eventually concludes that there exists an 
asymmetry in the analogies with respect to the following two claims: 
B. The totality of spatial parts is without remainder in each of two separated periods [of 
time] in one region [of space; and where “totality of spatial parts” designates the parts of 
a body at a single time; such as all of the parts of the pen at time 1]. 
 
C. The totality of temporal parts is without remainder in each of two separated regions [of 
space] throughout one period [of time; and where “totality of temporal parts” designates 
all of the temporal parts that comprise the object; such as all of the times at which the pen 
exists] (1981, 69) 
 
While case B is clearly possible, Shorter reasons that, “for C to be true, an object would 
have to be without remainder in each of two separated regions [of space] throughout its 
existence, which is impossible” (69). On this basis, he rejects the spatiotemporal 
analogies, proclaiming that “there is here a difference between space and time.” (70)  
Has Shorter unearthed an irrefutable distinction between the concepts space and 
time? Unfortunately, once Taylor’s panoply of peculiar material “objects” is taken into 
consideration, it seems quite easy to procure examples that satisfy case C, thereby 
overthrowing Shorter’s argument. Besides Taylor’s earthquake, there are numerous less 
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extravagant instances of “objects” (or things, events, processes, etc.) whose “totality of 
temporal parts” can exist without remainder at two or more separated spatial regions: e.g., 
families, countries, schools, etc. Many countries, such as Japan or New Zealand, have 
several main parts that are spatially separated, usually by large bodies of water. These 
countries thus possess parts at separated regions, yet it is nonetheless true that the totality 
of the temporal parts of the whole “object” (i.e., Japan, New Zealand) is without 
remainder in each of these separated parts. In other words, each spatial part contains the 
complete set of temporal parts, and not a greater or lesser set of temporal parts (if that is 
how Shorter interprets the phrase “without remainder”v). Consequently, Shorter’s 
contention that B and C mark a distinction between space and time appears to be 
premature—unless, of course, he challenges the ontological status of these “objects”. Yet, 
as mentioned above, trying to limit the debate to so-called ordinary or commonplace 
objects, like books or trees, shifts the controversy away from the specific spatiotemporal 
analogies under consideration to a very different, and difficult, host of metaphysical 
issues. Shorter may be able to accomplish this daunting task, but it does seem a rather 
unfruitful and roundabout method of undermining Taylor’s and Schlesinger’s analogies 
(and may be impossible). 
 
II. 
One of central themes to emerge in the critical investigation of Taylor’s and 
Schlesinger’s hypotheses is the allegation that their analogies tacitly presuppose a 
curiously restricted account of spatial magnitude. Instead of the analogist’s simple 
classification of bodily “part” into one of two camps, i.e., the spatial and the temporal, the 
critics claim that a further category of spatial magnitude is needed to fully capture the 
spatial component of material bodies (e.g., Shorter, 70; Meiland, 69). Specifically, the 
analogists have put forward two categories of spatiotemporal part: (SP1) the spatial parts 
that comprise an object at one moment of time (temporal place); and (TP1) the temporal 
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parts that comprise an object’s entire history, but may include more than one spatial 
place. In the analogies offered to support (SP1), such as a person standing in a door way, 
a brick wall, etc., the spatial parts occupy only one temporal place. In the analogies that 
form instances of (TP1), on the other hand, the object need not occupy only one spatial 
place: e.g., a person has temporal parts that cover many different spatial places (as does 
our pen, since it can be moved to many different locations, although the brick wall 
cannot). Consequently, the basic character of the spatial and temporal parts employed by 
the analogists would appear to be fundamentally different, or asymmetric—and this 
essential difference may indicate the need for supplementary spatial or temporal 
concepts, or parts, to bring the analogies into a truly symmetrical relationship.  
The true spatial correlate of (TP1), in fact, should not be confined to one temporal 
position; rather, it should encompass all of the temporal places associated with the life 
span of the body. Just as (TP1) is not defined at one spatial place, but includes all of the 
spatial places occupied throughout the body’s history, the spatial analog of (TP1) should 
incorporate all of the temporal places (times) occupied by the body throughout its 
existence. This spatial analog of (TP1) would not necessarily be restricted to a single 
temporal place, therefore, unless the object only occupied a single temporal place (i.e., it 
existed for only an instant of time). Two questions can be raised in the light of this 
discussion: “Do material objects admit a spatial property of this sort?”, and if so, “Why 
have the spatiotemporal analogists hitherto failed to acknowledge its role in the 
analogies?” While the latter question would be difficult to hazard a response, there does 
exist a natural correlate to (TP1), which we can label (SP2): it is simply all of the spatial 
“places” occupied by a single object throughout its history, and thus coincides with all of 
the temporal places of (TP1). The “spatial places” occupied by a body throughout its life 
span, (SP2), should be sharply contrasted with the “spatial places” that form (SP1). 
Whereas the (SP1) parts are located at a single time, or temporal part, the spatial places 
that comprise (SP2) cover the many different spatial places that the body as a whole 
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occupies throughout its history: e.g., our person at one moment in time has spatial parts 
(SP1), such as her left foot, right foot, etc.; but she also occupies many different spatial 
locations throughout her lifetime, such as the doorway, living room, porch, etc. 
Accordingly, each individual (SP2) spatial part contains a complete set of (SP1) spatial 
parts, since each (SP2) parts coincides with one (TP1) temporal part. To summarize: the 
spatiotemporal analogists have mistakenly singled out the wrong set of spatial parts as the 
true analog of (TP1)—(SP2) is the spatiotemporal analog of (TP1), and not (SP1). 
With the realization that the spatial parts of a body can be classified into two 
different categories, one may reasonably wonder if the spatiotemporal analogists’ goal to 
equate spatial and temporal concepts remains a viable option. Since there are two distinct 
spatial components of a body, but only one temporal component, do the analogists have 
any grounds for asserting the similarity of space and time?  
First of all, the challenge to the analogists is provide a correct temporal equivalent 
of (SP1), which we can label (TP0) in order to maintain the symmetrical relationship 
between our spatial and temporal pairs; i.e., (SP2) with (TP1), and (SP1) with (TP0). 
(TP0) can be identified as “the temporal parts that comprise an object at a single spatial 
place,” although “spatial part” can be defined in one of two ways, depending on whether 
you employ the (SP1) or (SP2) definition. In either case, the temporal parts are localized 
to either one part of a body at a single time (e.g., one foot of the entire body), or the 
whole body at a single time (e.g., the entire human body), following (SP1) and (SP2) 
respectively. What is intriguing about the temporal “value” of each of these temporal 
parts, in either the (SP1) or (SP2) variant of the (TP0) definition, is that they are all 
identical. Whether the temporal parts are assigned to the spatial parts of a body at one 
spatial place, or to the spatial parts over its spatial history, the temporal parts all have the 
same value; namely, “one instant of time” (or one temporal place). Since all temporal 
parts are equal, there are no variations in the relative values of the temporal parts of 
bodies.vi Spatial parts, on the other hand, do vary in quantity or value. The spatial parts of 
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a body at a single time, (SP1), differ in size (e.g., our foot is smaller than our leg), and the 
spatial parts of our whole bodies, (SP2), are often quite different at the many spatial 
places occupied over the course of our lives (e.g., our bodies take up much less volume at 
six months of age than at six years, or sixty years). Yet, all these different spatial parts 
retain the identical temporal value, since all instants of time are identical—Does this 
insight amount to a further unbalancing of the analogists case for spatiotemporal 
equivalency?  
Although initially it may seem to pose a problem, the analogists can fall back 
upon the difference in the dimensionality of space and time to explain the identical values 
of temporal parts. In short, spatial parts inhabit a three-dimensional domain, whereas 
temporal parts are confined to a single dimension. A spatial part can expand in three 
dimensions, thus offering a freedom denied to the temporal parts whose single 
dimensionality can only allow one axis of expansion (in length). And given a Newtonian 
physical framework, where the nature of time is unaffected by the size and mass of 
physical bodies, the one-dimensional interval or extent of any temporal part will always 
remain the same (see Endnote 6). To condemn the analogists’ project based only on this 
difference in dimensionality seems disingenuous, therefore. Since the hypotheses of the 
spatiotemporal analogists’ cannot be undermined on the mere grounds of the dimensional 
limitation of time, the critics will need to look elsewhere for an effective means of 
countering the analogies. 
As a second strategy for the overturning the analogist’s thesis, one might utilize 
the newly discovered asymmetry in spatial and temporal parts, as discussed above, to 
question the very admissibility of the spatiotemporal objects employed in the analogies. 
The examples provided by Taylor and Schlesinger are not of the correct type, it might be 
alleged, since these analogies are instances of (SP1), and not (SP2). With the realization 
that the true analogous counterpart of (TP1) is (SP2), the majority, if not all, of the 
examples offered by the analogists, which are of the (SP1) sort, thus fail to establish the 
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similarity of space and time. For instance, returning to Taylor’s “earthquake” analogy (as 
required to satisfy case (2) above), it might seem at first glance that an earthquake is a 
moving “object”. Yet, it is not an object that moves as a whole relative to other objects, 
since, on Taylor’s own admission, the earthquake simultaneously at both towns is the 
same earthquake. Consequently, the whole earthquake does not move relative to its 
surroundings; where “move” should be understood as the occupation of a different spatial 
place by each spatial part of the earthquake. Taylor’s earthquake is an object that exhibits 
a variable and changing spatial extension at one spatial place, in the (SP1) sense, such 
that some parts remain fixed while others are free to wander to different locations. In 
Aristotelian terms, one would classify Taylor’s earthquake as an object that undergoes a 
change in quantity (growth or diminution) at one general place, rather than a change 
(motion) wherein each spatial part experiences a change in place. What the 
spatiotemporal analogists must provide, therefore, is a clear and unambiguous instance of 
an (SP2) material object (and its set of spatial parts) that fulfills the case (2) requirements 
as outlined above: i.e., an object that occupies two separate places at the same time but 
can move as a whole to different times within that spatial distance.   
Unfortunately, it is not altogether certain that Taylor’s wandering earthquake 
example does not satisfy the criterion just described: when the earthquake occurs at the 
place located between the two original towns, it could be interpreted as a movement of 
the whole earthquake to this new position, thus fulfilling the demand for a motion of the 
whole object from its original position to a new spatial place. Once again, the enigmatic 
and equivocal properties of Taylor’s specially chosen “objects” would seem to have 
thwarted an attempt to discredit his spatiotemporal analogies. At this juncture, one might 
reasonably ask if there is any plausible strategy for countering the analogist’s theory? 
While the previous method of attacking the analogist’s case harbors various 
deficiencies, the seeds of a more successful strategy are implicitly contained in its general 
acknowledgment of the asymmetry of spatial and temporal parts. As noted in section 1, 
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one of the best means of undermining the spatiotemporal analogist’s theory is to call into 
question the alleged similarities in their most basic or primary examples. In the example 
afforded by Taylor, the person in the doorway simultaneously occupies two spatial 
places, thereby satisfying case (2) (which contends that a body can occupy two spatial 
places at one time). However, since the spatial parts involved in this specific case are of 
the (SP1) variety, a noticeable difference, or disanalogy, is readily apparent in relation to 
the objects that comprise instances of case (1) (which holds that a body can occupy two 
times at a single spatial place). For the person in the doorway, the spatial part of the body 
located at either spatial place only contains a spatial part of the whole object (i.e., a foot, 
or leg, etc., of the entire spatially-extended person); whereas in examples that satisfy case 
(2), such as the pen on the desk, the whole spatial object is located at each temporal part. 
That is, any temporal slice of the pen contains its entire set of spatial parts, the whole 
spatially-extended pen, and not merely a part of that spatial object, such as the “left-half” 
or “right-half” of the pen. Any spatial slice of the object, the “left-half”, for instance, fails 
to provide the entire spatial object, as well as the entire temporal object.   
To summarize, in Taylor’s case (2) example, each spatial part contains: one (SP1) 
spatial part of the object at a single time (say, the person’s left foot at place 1), and one 
(TP1) temporal part of the object’s complete temporal history (the person’s left foot at 
time 1, place 1). In contrast, each temporal part of the instances that comprise case (1) 
exhibit: one temporal part (TP1) of the object’s temporal life span (the pen at time 1), but 
also contain the entire (SP1) spatial object—i.e., all of the (SP1) parts of the pen at time 
1, and not its “left-half” or “right-half” at time 1. The realization that the entire set of 
(SP1) parts are obtained in case (1), but not in case (2), thus unmasks a serious 
inconsistency—i.e., a disanalogy—that lies at the heart of the spatiotemporal analogists’ 
hypothesis. Indeed, the disanalogy is evident in the most fundamental examples allotted 
to the hypothesis! 
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More importantly, this disanalogy is not subject to the problem encountered on 
several occasions above; namely, the use of irregular and unusual “objects” to evade the 
counter-arguments launched by the critics. All of the strange objects offered by the 
analogists, whether earthquakes, soundwaves, or island nations (our example), are 
instances of bodies possessing (SP1) spatial parts. That is, the spatial parts of the objects 
referred to in the analogies are of the (SP1) type: e.g., the earthquake’s presence at one of 
the towns is a spatial part of the earthquake; and one of the islands that comprise New 
Zealand is considered a spatial part of that country. Hence, appealing to these unusual 
objects to salvage the analogist’s thesis does not eliminate the disanalogies. A spatial part 
of Taylor’s earthquake, as an instance of case (2), still provides only a single (SP1) 
spatial part; whereas the temporal parts, in the examples of case (1), include all the (SP1) 
spatial parts. Likewise, a spatial part of New Zealand does not yield the entire nation, 
although a temporal part does. The fact that the appeal to these unusual objects does not 
eliminate the disanalogies can now be seen as the principle virtue of this line of criticism 
of the spatiotemporal analogists’ theory. We are also in a position to better grasp the 
underlying reason for the deficiency in Shorter’s analysis (as described above). With 
respect to such objects as island nations or university campuses, each (SP1) spatial part 
does not provide a complete set of (TP1) temporal parts, although each (TP1) temporal 
part does contain a complete set of (SP1) spatial parts.vii 
By way of conclusion, it might be instructive to explore the underlying reasons 
for the failure of the analogists’ arguments, as well as suggest possible remedies or 
alternative formulations of their primary examples. In particular, one might wonder if the 
lessons gained from the preceding analysis can be put to work to rectify the analogies. 
Recalling the asymmetry in spatial and temporal parts, the quick answer to these 
questions revolves around the possibility of constructing analogies based on the (SP2) 
concept of spatial part, and not on the erroneous (SP1) model assumed by all of the 
analogists. Since the correct analog of (TP1) is (SP2), the analogists must produce 
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scenarios involving an object’s (SP2) parts that satisfy case (2), just as the many 
examples of (TP1) temporal parts uphold case (1). Specifically, if we restrict the inquiry 
to the spatial parts that the whole body occupies over the course of its history, can we 
conceive possible instances where the body as a whole occupies two different spatial 
locations—i.e., instances where all of the (SP1) parts are simultaneously at two different 
(SP2) spatial locations? Once again, it is important to point out that this scenario is the 
true analog of case (1), since that case concerns all of those objects whose (SP1) parts 
(either the entire set or just one part) can exist at two separate (TP1) temporal places.   
Overall, it does not seem possible to supply examples of objects whose complete 
set of (SP1) spatial parts are located at two (SP2) spatial places at the same time. In 
essence, the object would need to be “wholly in each instance”, much like a Platonic 
Form or universal: e.g., the pen would need to exist as a whole at two spatial places, such 
as completely on the table and completely on the floor, at the same time—and this does 
not seem physically possible, let alone conceptually possible. Given this more accurate 
interpretation of cases (1) and (2), therefore, the deficiencies in the analogies provided by 
Taylor and Schlesinger become fully evident, as does their claims for the similarities of 
spatial and temporal concepts. In short, the similarities in space and time should not blind 
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1971), 6, 225.) Thus, merely defining objects and events in such a way that Taylor’s thesis is eliminated by 
fiat would appear to be an unfruitful and ungenerous way of addressing the issue, and will certainly be 
rejected by Taylor. As discussed on numerous occasions in this essay, the more convincing and productive 
attack on Taylor’s analogies should proceed by first accepting his notions of “object”, “place”, etc., and 
then move on to produce an inconsistency or disanalogy based on his very own conceptual apparatus.          
 
v Shorter would appear to sanction this reading of the situation, for he later admits that “C is possible 
though only for a [spatially] discontinuous object.” (73) 
 
vi We are assuming a classical physics backdrop throughout this essay, since we are mainly dealing with 
macroscopic bodies (at low speeds, and ignoring the spatial and temporal distortions near large 
gravitational sources). Hence, the time dilation effects of Relativity Theory are not a factor, and this 
prohibits any such variance of temporal values among observers. On the whole, the spatiotemporal 
analogists confine their analogies to these classically well-behaved, if not mundane, macro-scopic material 
objects (which also avoids the spatial and temporal complexities at the micro-level of Quantum Theory).    
 
vii In all fairness, Shorter does reach a similar conclusion (73), although his objection is lost in a crowd of 
other, less effective, arguments. Moreover, Shorter only raises this problem explicitly with respect to one 
spatiotemporal analogy, and not for all the analogies. By not making this objection his fundamental 
argument against the spatiotemporal analogies, Shorter does not succeed in clearly and unambiguously pin-
pointing their primary deficiency. Similar claims can be made concerning Meiland’s analysis of the 
analogies (70).   
 
viii This essay has undergone a long gestation period, but I would like to thank all of the people who have 
provided invaluable comments over the many years that marked its (somewhat dilatory) formation: Walter 
Edelberg, Paul Teller, Marc Wilson, an anonymous referee from The Southern Journal of Philosophy, and 
especially (the late) Irving Thalberg.  





Abstract  (WORD COUNT: 100) 
This paper investigates a famous argument, first introduced by Richard Taylor, that 
attempts to establish a radical similarity in the concepts of space and time. The argument 
contends that the spatial and temporal aspects of material bodies are much more alike, or 
analogous, than has been hitherto acknowledged. As will be demonstrated, most of the 
previous investigations of Taylor and company have failed to pinpoint the weakest link in 
their complex of analogies. By concentrating on their most fundamental cases, however, 
a substantial difference, or disanalogy, can be brought to light that undermines this 
purported equivalence of space and time.        
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